Venture Capital Meets Contract Theory: Risky Claims or Formal Control? by Cestone, G.
Cestone, G. (2014). Venture Capital Meets Contract Theory: Risky Claims or Formal Control?. 
Review of Finance, 18(3), pp. 1097-1137. doi: 10.1093/rof/rft021 
City Research Online
Original citation: Cestone, G. (2014). Venture Capital Meets Contract Theory: Risky Claims or 
Formal Control?. Review of Finance, 18(3), pp. 1097-1137. doi: 10.1093/rof/rft021 
Permanent City Research Online URL: http://openaccess.city.ac.uk/7010/
 
Copyright & reuse
City University London has developed City Research Online so that its users may access the 
research outputs of City University London's staff. Copyright © and Moral Rights for this paper are 
retained by the individual author(s) and/ or other copyright holders.  All material in City Research 
Online is checked for eligibility for copyright before being made available in the live archive. URLs 
from City Research Online may be freely distributed and linked to from other web pages. 
Versions of research
The version in City Research Online may differ from the final published version. Users are advised 
to check the Permanent City Research Online URL above for the status of the paper.
Enquiries
If you have any enquiries about any aspect of City Research Online, or if you wish to make contact 
with the author(s) of this paper, please email the team at publications@city.ac.uk.
1Venture Capital Meets Contract Theory: Risky
Claims or Formal Control?
GIACINTA CESTONE
Cass Business School, City University London, CSEF, and ECGI
Abstract. This paper develops a theory of the joint allocation of control and cash-flow
rights in venture capital (VC) deals. When the need for VC advice and support calls for
a high-powered outside claim, the entrepreneur should optimally retain control in order
to avoid undue interference. Hence, I predict that more high-powered claims should be
associated with fewer control rights. This challenges the idea that control should always
be attached to equity-like claims, and is in line with contractual terms used in venture
capital, in corporate venturing and in partnerships between biotech start-ups and large
corporations. The paper also rationalizes evidence that venture capital contracts include
contingencies triggering both a reduction in VC control and the automatic conversion of
VC’s preferred stock into common.
Keywords: Control Rights, Cash-Flow Rights, Security Design, Venture Capital.
JEL Classification: G24, G32
1. Introduction
In the last decade empirical studies of venture capital finance have highlighted that in VC
deals control rights are allocated independently of cash-flow rights, through separate and
distinct contractual covenants (see Kaplan and Stro¨mberg, 2003 and 2004, or Cumming
and Johan, 2007 and 2009). This suggests that the rights held by VC investors cannot be
described by the standard array of securities defined in corporate finance textbooks. One
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Lerner, Holger Mu¨ller, Giovanna Nicodano, Fausto Panunzi, Patrick Rey, Rune Stenbacka,
Per Stro¨mberg, Lucy White and an anonymous referee for their very constructive com-
ments and suggestions. I also thank seminar participants at the CEPR meeting on The
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nancial Markets (Gerzensee), the Institut d’Ana`lisi Econo`mica (Barcelona), Universitat
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notable example is the widespread use in VC deals of several classes of common stock to
which very different voting, board and liquidation rights are attached. This paper develops
a financial contracting model to investigate the joint allocation of control and cash flow
rights attained through contractual covenants in VC deals.1
Control and cash-flow rights seem to follow a joint pattern in venture capital contracts,
which suggests they are strongly interrelated. In their extensive study of venture capital
agreements, Kaplan and Stro¨mberg (2003) find that while VCs usually take preferred
stock in the firms they fund, other covenants attribute to VCs’ preferred stock substantial
control rights. Conversely, in many corporate venturing deals and in partnerships between
biotech start-ups and big drug companies, the investor takes a majority equity stake in
the start-up, but few or no seats on the board of directors. This evidence is striking, in
that, contrary to common wisdom, more equity-like claims seem to be associated with
weaker control rights. Existing financial contracting models do not offer an explanation
for this fact. Trying to fill this gap, my paper addresses two questions on the optimal form
of venture capital contracts: might it be desirable to assign substantial control rights to
more debt-like claims such as preferred stock, and fewer control rights to more equity-like
claims? If so, when are VCs more likely to take common stock with less than proportional
voting and board rights?
The paper studies the optimal contracting problem of an early start-up seeking venture
capital finance in a setting where two non-contractible efforts – entrepreneurial effort and
VC advice – are crucial for the start-up’s success. At the seed stage, the entrepreneur must
exert effort in researching the different projects available (EN initiative); the VC may also
learn the relevant information through costly monitoring. After information gathering
takes place, a project is selected by the party in control. At a later stage, the venture
1 Hellmann (1998, 2006) and Dess´ı (2004) also take an optimal contracting approach to
study the joint allocation of control and cash flow rights in VC deals, yet they focus on
different issues (see my literature discussion). Hellmann (1998) has been the first to point
out that “the separation of control rights from financial structure is important since for
any given financial structure it is always possible to allocate control rights independently.
If control resides with the board of directors, then the contract between the VC and the
EN may directly determine the board structure. And if control emanates from holding
the majority of the voting stock, then voting power can be attached to any financial
instrument.”
VENTURE CAPITAL MEETS CONTRACT THEORY 3
capitalist may provide professional advice in formulating the firm’s strategy, introduce the
firm to potential customers and suppliers, and help recruit key employees (VC support).
In modeling the VC role, I account for the fundamental difference between VC support
and VC interference highlighted in recent empirical work.2 To significantly interfere in the
firm’s project selection, the venture capitalist needs formal control rights. Conversely, the
VC can provide support and advice even when the founding entrepreneur controls the firm.
Based on this premise, the following trade-off is analyzed. To induce costly VC support,
one would like to sell the venture capitalist a high-powered claim. However, if the VC is
granted formal control over project selection, a high-powered claim also induces excessive
VC interference, which in turn kills entrepreneurial initiative.3 In other words, when the
venture capitalist’s monetary payoff is very sensitive to the firm’s performance, the cost
of her formal control in terms of entrepreneurial initiative may become too high. This
trade-off formalizes a typical entrepreneurial attitude towards venture capitalists. On the
one hand, entrepreneurs want VC investors to support their firms with professional advice
and business connections; on the other hand, entrepreneurs are unhappy and demotivated
when VCs exercise too much control on their firms.
The paper investigates how an appropriate design of financial claims and control rights
may enable entrepreneurs to induce VC support (the bright side of venture capital) while
limiting VC interference (the dark side of venture capital). Intuitively, when the need
for costly support calls for very high-powered VC incentives, the entrepreneur should
retain control, thus avoiding investor interference. This implies that when VC support is
particularly costly, the venture capitalist holds a class of common stock with no formal
2 Hellmann and Puri (2002), Kaplan and Stro¨mberg (2004), and Cumming and Johan
(2007) identify two different roles for venture capitalists. A supporting role, which is wel-
come by firm founders, whereby the VC contributes to the venture by helping hire key
personnel or providing advice on R&D, strategy and product development. And a con-
trolling (or “adversarial”) role, whereby the VC may forcefully replace the founder with
an outside CEO, or impose other decisions that conflict with the founder’s preferences.
The evidence in these papers suggests that VC support and interference respond to dif-
ferent contractual mechanisms and thus do not necessarily go hand in hand. Kaplan and
Stro¨mberg (2004) find for instance that VC interference is related to VC board control,
while VC support is related to VC equity ownership.
3 In the spirit of Aghion and Tirole (1997), it is the venture capitalist’s real control over
project selection (“VC interference”) that discourages entrepreneurial initiative.
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control attached, whereas the entrepreneur holds preferred stock and retains most control
rights. When instead VC support is not very costly, the VC holds preferred stock but is
given formal control.
The results in the paper challenge the textbook assumption that common stock should
always be associated with more control rights than preferred stock, and are in line with
evidence of real-world VC contracts that include covenants attaching substantial control to
preferred stock. My findings also rationalize the evidence that corporate VCs, who suffer
from potential conflicts of interest with their portfolio firms and thus need high-powered
incentives, hold common stock with little control attached. An extension of the model also
provides an explanation for the inclusion in VC deals of contingencies that trigger both a
reduction in the investor’s control rights and the (automatic) conversion of her preferred
stock into common stock (see Gompers, 1999; Kaplan and Stro¨mberg, 2003).
The model presented combines two incentive problems that have been studied separately
in the literature, one which focuses on the non-contractible VC’s advice and support, and a
second one which focuses on the costs of investor overmonitoring. The advising/supporting
role of venture capitalists has been explored in a series of papers including Schmidt (2003),
Casamatta (2003), Repullo and Suarez (2004), Inderst and Mu¨ller (2004) and Renucci
(2006). These models focus on the optimal allocation of cash flow rights in venture capital,
but do not endogenize control allocation.
The dark sides of investor monitoring have been unveiled in two related papers. Burkart,
Gromb and Panunzi (1997) show that shareholder monitoring and interference may kill
entrepreneurial initiative, thus reducing firm value. In Pagano and Ro¨ell (1998), excess
monitoring occurs as large shareholders do not internalize the entrepreneur’s private ben-
efits. In both papers, ownership concentration inevitably leads to undue investor interfer-
ence, as large equity stakes are assumed to come with formal control. Therefore, dispersed
ownership is called for to dilute the monitoring incentives of large shareholders. My model
allows for both types of overmonitoring costs, but endogenizes the allocation of control;
hence, high-powered investor claims induce overmonitoring only when associated with for-
mal control rights. By combining the overmonitoring problem with the need to incentivize
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non-contractible VC support, I show that the joint design of control and cash flow rights
can take care of both sides of the coin – spurring the investor’s support while limiting her
interference.
My paper is also related to early financial contracting models, where control and cash
flow rights were obtained for the first time from an optimization problem. In the costly
state verification models of Townsend (1979), Diamond (1984) and Gale and Hellwig (1985)
the optimal contract allocates to the investor a flat claim and the right to intervene (that
is, to audit the firm) if the payment is not made – a standard debt contract. In these
papers, the type of control associated with a flat claim consists of the right to intervene
in low income states; conversely, my paper shows that in VC environments the right to
select the firm’s strategy in normal times can be attached to a flat claim.
Other papers have studied the joint design of control and cash flow rights in venture
capital.4 In Hellmann (1998) a specific control right, the right to appoint the CEO, is
relinquished to the venture capitalist to give her incentives to engage in an executive
search, while cash-flow rights take care of entrepreneurial incentives. In Dess´ı (2005), con-
trol over the liquidation decision as well as cash-flow rights are designed so as to induce
VC’s monitoring and efficient continuation decisions, while also taking care of the poten-
tial for collusion between the VC and the entrepreneur at the expense of outside investors.
Hellmann (2006) studies the allocation of control on the exit decision (IPO versus acqui-
sition). These papers focus on aspects of the venture’s life where it is vital for the VC
to hold superior control rights. I add to this literature by pointing out that control and
interference in other stages of a venture can instead be detrimental to firm value. This
allows me to provide a rationale for those deals where the VC does not seek much control
4 This strand of literature owes to Dewatripont and Tirole (1994) the idea that control and
cash-flow rights are interrelated. In that model, the optimal capital structure allows for
multiple claim-holders with contingent control rights: debt-holders (who prefer manager-
unfriendly actions) should have control after bad performance, and equity-holders (whose
preferences are more aligned with the manager’s) should have control after good perfor-
mance. This can rationalize the observed correlation between control and cash-flow rights
within standard securities (i.e., debt and equity) used by traditional corporations, but not
the hybrid securities devised in more innovative venture capital arrangements.
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despite buying a high-powered claim in the company.5 Schindele (2003) also trades off VC
monitoring and VC advice in an optimal contracting model and yields a similar predic-
tion that high-powered claims and monitoring/interference may be negatively correlated.
However, in contrast to my theory the main driving force in her model is the assumption
that advice is spurred by high-powered financial claims while monitoring is best induced
by a debt-like claim.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the model. Section 3 studies the
benchmark case where VC support is contractible, revisiting the trade off between mon-
itoring and entrepreneurial initiative. In section 4, VC support is assumed to be non-
contractible, and the optimal control and cash-flow right allocation is solved for. In Section
5, I discuss the robustness of my results, and draw an extension of the model to allow for
a contingent allocation of control and cash-flow rights. The paper’s empirical predictions
and the relation with existing evidence are discussed in section 6. Section 7 concludes.
The Appendix collects most of the proofs.
2. The model
An entrepreneur has an innovative investment project that requires a fixed initial invest-
ment I. The investment is risky and generates a verifiable random outcome R˜. R˜ takes the
value RL ∈ (0, I) in case of failure and the value RH = RL +∆R (with ∆R > 0) in case of
success. The entrepreneur (EN) has no money, hence he has to raise funds from a venture
capitalist (VC). Pure financiers (OUT) can as well contribute to the initial investment
I. Investors behave competitively in the market for funds. All agents in the model are
risk-neutral, and the riskless interest rate is normalized to zero.
5 Other papers analyzing the allocation of control rights between entrepreneurs and ven-
ture capitalists obtain predictions that contrast with mine. Chan, Siegel and Thakor (1990)
predict that VCs should bear all cash-flow risk when in control, while in Kirilenko (2001)
the VC demands control rights that are disproportionately large compared to the size of
her equity.
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2.1 PROJECTS
At date 0, when external financing is raised and the investment made, the entrepreneurial
idea is still vague (for instance, there may be alternative discoveries or patents to pursue).6
The start-up faces N + 1 a priori identical projects, k ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . . , N}. All projects may
fail or succeed, but they differ in their probability of success and the non-verifiable private
cost they entail for the entrepreneur. The status-quo project (project 0) is known: it
succeeds with probability q ∈ {0, p} and imposes a private cost γ > 0 on the entrepreneur.
The payoffs attached to the N other projects are not known by the parties unless further
investigation is carried out. However, all players know the following facts from date 0.
First, (N − 2) projects are worse than project 0 for both VC and EN, and at least one
of them is a “disastrous project” inflicting a huge non-monetary loss (e.g., in terms of
reputation) on both. Second, there exist two projects, indexed N − 1 and N, that have
probabilities of success and private costs to EN equal to:
N − 1 N
q + τ, 0 q, γ
with probability λ; or:
N − 1 N
q + τ, γ q, 0
with probability 1− λ, where q + τ ∈ (0, 1) and λ ∈ (0, 1). At t = 0, Nature determines
whether project N − 1 or project N impose the private cost γ on the entrepreneur.7
However, as stated above, a party cannot observe the payoffs attached to different projects
unless successful information gathering has been carried out. The following assumption
implies that N − 1 is the first best project.
6 This pattern is quite common in the biotech sector: when a biotech start-up is financed,
it is typically still unknown which therapeutic products it will pursue and in which order.
Only at a subsequent stage, the management of clinical trials determines which of several
therapeutic uses of a drug will seek regulatory approval (see Lerner and Merges, 1998).
7 In Section ??, I show that as long as EN’s monetary incentives are not too high-powered,
the entrepreneur prefers project N to project N − 1 whenever the latter imposes the
private cost γ on him, which happens with probability (1− λ). To the extent that the
venture capitalist always prefers the efficient project N − 1, Nature’s move determines
whether EN and VC’s preferences over projects are aligned or not. λ then measures the
congruence of interests between EN and VC (Aghion and Tirole, 1997).
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Assumption 1. τ∆R > γ.
2.2 INFORMATION GATHERING
At t = 1, after the investment cost has been paid, the entrepreneur exerts a non-verifiable
effort e ∈ [0, 1] to learn the project payoffs. At a private cost e2/2 he learns the payoff of
all candidate projects with probability e. This effort could be interpreted as additional
research pursued to come up with a well-defined product; hence, I will refer to it as
entrepreneurial initiative. Simultaneously, the venture capitalist exerts a non-verifiable
effort E ∈ [0, 1] at a cost E2/2 to monitor the entrepreneur’s research activity. I assume
the following monitoring technology: the VC can only become informed if the entrepreneur
is; if the entrepreneur learns the project payoffs, the VC also learns them with probability
E, and does not learn with probability (1−E).
2.3 PROJECT SELECTION
At t = 2, a project must be selected. Although the project choice is observable by informed
parties, it is not verifiable, hence compensation schemes based on project selection are not
feasible. The initial contract must then allocate the formal authority to choose a project to
either the entrepreneur or the venture capitalist.8 Under EN control, the entrepreneur has
the formal right to select a project. Under VC control, the VC has the formal right to select
a project; however, the entrepreneur can make a project proposal jen ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . . , N}:
after hearing the proposal, the VC can rubber-stamp it (jvc = jen), or choose a different
project (jvc ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . . , N} \ jen). I assume that control rights cannot be renegotiated.
The robustness of results to renegotiation is discussed in Section ??.
2.4 VC’S LATE STAGE MORAL HAZARD
At t = 3, when the selected project is implemented, support and advice from the VC are
needed.9 If VC advice and support are provided, q = p; project k’s probability of success
8 Remark 2 in Section ?? discusses the more general case where a probabilistic control
allocation is allowed for.
9 The assumption that the VC provides support after basic research has been carried out
is not crucial to the paper’s results. Indeed, even if the timing was reversed the basic
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is then p+ τk > 0, where τk ∈ {0, τ}. If VC advice/support is not provided, q = 0: project
k’s probability of success is then τk.
10 The VC’s advising effort is unverifiable and prone
to moral hazard: when the venture capitalist does not exert any effort, she enjoys a private
benefit c ∈ (0, p∆R).
Assumption 2. RL + τ∆R− I + c < 0 < RL + p∆R− I − γ.
The left hand side inequality in Assumption 2 implies that the start-up is not worth
funding unless the VC provides advice at t = 3; the right hand side inequality implies that
when the VC provides advice, even the status-quo project (project 0) generates a positive
surplus.
2.5 SEQUENCE OF EVENTS
The timing assumed here is suited to the companies I am trying to model, namely R&D
start-ups (such as biotech firms) that are still far from bringing a product to the market.
It is summarized in the following figure:
Please insert figure 1 about here.
Fig. 1. Time line
2.6 CONTRACTS
As projects cannot be described and contracted upon ex ante, the contract must allocate
to either EN or VC the formal control over project selection. At t = 0 the entrepreneur
makes a take-it-or-leave-it contract offer to the venture capitalist (and possibly to pure
financiers) specifying the parties’ cash-flow rights and control-rights. Due to the non-
verifiability of projects, cash-flow rights can be contingent on the final outcome, but not
trade-off between VC support and VC interference would still be there. Whether VCs
provide more support at an earlier or later stage is largely an empirical question on which
the evidence is mixed. See for instance Sapienza (1992) and Kaplan and Stro¨mberg (2004).
10 The venture capitalist’s effort directly increases the profitability of a project. This
assumption is meant to capture her role as an advisor, in contrast to the monitoring role
a` la Holmstro¨m and Tirole (1997).
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on the project choice. Therefore, the contract specifies the parties’ payoffs in case of
failure (RLi , i = en, vc, out) and success (R
H
i , i = en, vc, out), where the subscripts en, vc,
out denote respectively the entrepreneur, the VC, and the pure financiers. Entrepreneurs
and investors are protected by limited liability: only the project outcome can be shared.
The VC’s incentives depend on the sensitivity of her financial claim to the project
outcome, which is measured by:
δvc ≡ R
H
vc −R
L
vc.
The VC holds a riskier (or more “high-powered”) financial claim when δvc is larger. Anal-
ogously, the entrepreneur’s incentives depend on the sensitivity of his claim to the project
outcome:
δen ≡ R
H
en −R
L
en.
I also define:
δI ≡ δvc + δout,
and
RLI ≡ R
L
vc +R
L
out.
2.7 FIRST BEST BENCHMARK
As a benchmark, it is useful to consider the case where all efforts are observable, and any
information collected after t = 1 is hard, so that control allocation is not an issue. In this
case, project N − 1 is adopted whenever it is identified; furthermore, the VC always pro-
vides advice to the firm. Monitoring is redundant (hence EFB = 0), while entrepreneurial
initiative maximizes the net social surplus generated by the investment:
RL + p∆R− γ − I + e(τ∆R+ λγ)−
e2
2
The first best level of initiative is:
eFB = τ∆R+ λγ,
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that I assume to be smaller than 1. I also assume that the surplus is positive in the first
best:
V FB ≡ RL + p∆R− γ − I +
(τ∆R+ λγ)2
2
> 0.
As implied by the Modigliani and Miller theorem, in this scenario it is irrelevant whether
the initial investment is funded solely by the VC or pure financiers also participate in the
financing. The shape of cash-flow rights is also irrelevant.
3. The Benchmark: Contractible VC Support
This section focuses on the second benchmark case where VC support is contractible, but
information gathering efforts are not and information is soft. This allows to revisit the
basic trade off between VC monitoring and EN initiative (Burkart, Gromb and Panunzi,
1997) in a setting where formal control allocation is endogenous.
To study the optimal control and cash flow right allocation when VC support is con-
tractible, I proceed in the following way. First, I establish under which conditions control
allocation actually matters; to this aim, I show that different cash flow right allocations can
induce congruent or dissonant preferences over projects, depending on how high-powered
the entrepreneur’s claim is. Secondly, I derive the optimal cash flow right allocation under,
respectively, EN control and VC control. Finally, I compare the social surplus generated
under the two arrangements to determine the optimal allocation of control.
3.1 PROJECT SELECTION AND MONETARY INCENTIVES
As the entrepreneur responds to monetary incentives, the shape of his claim determines
which project he would select or propose when informed about project payoffs. This im-
plies that control allocation matters or not, depending on whether the EN’s financial claim
is relatively low or high-powered.11 If τδen ≥ γ, the entrepreneur prefers the project gen-
erating the largest monetary benefits (project N − 1) even when this entails a private cost
γ. In this case, high-powered monetary incentives are perfectly aligning EN’s preferences
11 This is in contrast to Aghion and Tirole (1997), where the agent is infinitely averse to
risk and thus does not respond to monetary incentives.
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over projects with VC’s preferences, making control allocation irrelevant. Conversely, if
τδen < γ, the entrepreneur prefers project N to project N − 1 whenever the former in-
volves no private cost γ and the latter does. Hence, EN and VC have dissonant preferences
over projects with probability (1− λ); the degree of dissonance is increasing in the distance
γ − τδen and is thus endogenous in the model.
The following Lemma shows that the “control irrelevance”case can be ruled out when-
ever the initial investment cost is sufficiently large.
Lemma 1. There exists a threshold I1 such that control allocation matters if the initial
investment is relatively large (I > I1). Conversely, the parties’ preferences are congruent
and control allocation is irrelevant if I is small (I ≤ I1).
The intuition behind lemma ?? is simple. If the firm’s financing needs are sufficiently
large, a significant part of the outcome from the investment must be pledged to the
investors to satisfy their participation constraints. This limits the extent to which the
contract can provide the entrepreneur with high-powered monetary incentives, and in turn
implies that the entrepreneur’s preferences over projects cannot be aligned with the VC’s.
Hence, control allocation matters. In the rest of the paper, I rule out the less interesting
“control irrelevance”case by assuming that I > I1.
3.2 CASH FLOW RIGHTS UNDER EN CONTROL
When the entrepreneur has formal control, at t = 2 he selects his favorite project provided
he is informed about payoffs.12 If uninformed, the entrepreneur sticks with the status-quo
project, as the existence of disastrous projects makes it suboptimal to make an uninformed
choice. Note that as the VC can only be informed if the EN is, an uninformed entrepreneur
can never rely on the VC’s project proposal.
12 Owing to the non-verifiability of project choice, no contract can ensure that an informed
entrepreneur always chooses the efficient project. However, an informed entrepreneur op-
timally selects project N − 1 when this entails no private cost γ.
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At t = 1 the entrepreneur and the VC simultaneously choose their effort levels so as to
maximize their respective utilities. Under EN control, entrepreneurial initiative e and VC
monitoring E are determined by the following incentive compatibility constraints:
e ∈ argmax
e
RLen + pδen + eλτδen − (1− e)γ −
e2
2
, (1)
E ∈ argmax
E
RLvc + pδvc + eλτδvc −
E2
2
. (2)
Equilibrium efforts at stage 1 under EN control are then:
eEN ≡ λτδen + γ (3)
EEN ≡ 0, (4)
where eEN < λτ∆R+ γ, ∀δen < ∆R.
The financial contract maximizes the expected utility of the entrepreneur, subject to
the VC’s participation constraint
RLvc + pδvc + eλτδvc ≥ Ivc, (5)
and the pure financiers’ participation constraint
RLout + pδout + eλτδout ≥ Iout. (6)
It is immediate that both participation constraints are binding at the optimum, and
the entrepreneur appropriates all the net social surplus:
V EN (e) = RL + p∆R− γ − I + e[λτ∆R+ γ]−
e2
2
. (7)
The optimal cash flow right allocation thus solves the program:
max
e,RL
i
,δi,Ii
V EN (e)
s.t.
(??), (??), (??),
RLi ≥ 0, and R
L
i + δi ≥ 0,
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where i = en, vc, out; the last two inequalities ensure limited liability holds.
Note that as δen = ∆R− δI , riskier VC and pure financier claims (i.e. a larger δI) come
at the expense of EN’s monetary incentives, thus jeopardizing entrepreneurial initiative
and the surplus generated by the firm. This implies that the optimal cash flow alloca-
tion under EN control minimizes the combined riskiness of investors’ claims δI , subject
to investors’ participation constraints. Moreover, to the extent that monitoring is zero
regardless of δvc, the VC and the pure financiers’ shares of the investment outcome, and
their respective contribution to the investment cost are not uniquely determined. These
facts are formally laid out in the following proposition.
Proposition 1. Define δENI as the smallest root of the equation
RL + pδI + (λτ(∆R− δI) + γ)λτδI = I. (8)
Then, when VC advice is contractible, under EN formal control it is uniquely optimal
to set RLen = 0 and δen = ∆R− δ
EN
I . This can be implemented by any combination of
VC funding and pure financier funding that satisfies RLvc +R
L
out = R
L, δvc + δout = δ
EN
I ,
Ivc + Iout = I.
3.3 CASH FLOW RIGHTS UNDER VC CONTROL
3.3.1 Monitoring and initiative under VC control
Under VC formal control, information gathering can lead to three outcomes at t = 2. With
probability (1− e) both parties are uninformed; in this case, the VC adopts the status-
quo project, as this dominates making an uninformed choice. With probability eE, both
VC and EN observe the project payoffs; in this case, the VC selects the efficient project
(jvc = N − 1) irrespective of EN’s proposal jen.
13 Finally, with probability e(1−E), EN
is informed but VC is not. The entrepreneur thus makes a project proposal jen 6= 0 to
the VC, and the VC infers that (i) EN is informed (ii) the project proposed is N − 1
with probability λ and project N with probability 1− λ. Formally, the VC’s beliefs about
13 Thus, jvc = jen if and only if jen = N − 1, which holds true when N − 1 imposes no
private cost γ on EN. Therefore, the selected project coincides with EN’s proposal (or
not) depending on Nature’s move at t = 0.
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the payoffs of proposed project are as follows: Pr(jen = N − 1/jen 6= 0) = λ; Pr(jen =
N/jen 6= 0) = 1− λ. It follows that for an uninformed VC, rubber-stamping EN’s proposal
(jvc = jen 6= 0) strictly dominates sticking to the status quo. Therefore, the informed EN
enjoys real control in spite of VC having formal control; in line with previous papers,
formal control turns into real control only when the controlling party is informed.14
At the information gathering stage (t = 1), the entrepreneur and the VC simultaneously
choose their effort levels so as to maximize their respective utility functions. e and E are
then determined by the following incentive compatibility constraints:
e ∈ argmax
e
RLen + pδen + eλτδen + eE(1− λ)τδen − eE(1− λ)γ − (1− e)γ −
e2
2
,
E ∈ argmax
E
RLvc + pδvc + eλτδvc + eE(1− λ)τδvc −
E2
2
.
The first order conditions of the incentive compatibility constraints define the reaction
functions in information gathering for EN and VC:
eV C(E) = (λτδen + γ)− (γ − τδen) (1− λ)E
EV C(e) = (1− λ)τδvce.
The entrepreneur’s initiative (e) is spurred by the prospect of having real control. Moni-
toring (E), and thus increased interference by the venture capitalist, can only inhibit such
initiative, hence eV C(E) is downward sloping; quite intuitively, this effect is increasing
in the degree of dissonance ((γ − τδen) (1− λ)).
15 The VC’s reaction function EV C(e) is
instead upward sloping: as the VC can only become informed when the entrepreneur is,
her incentives to monitor are boosted by EN’s information gathering.
Combining the parties’ first order conditions, and assuming interior solutions, one ob-
tains the equilibrium levels of initiative and monitoring under VC control as functions of
14 See for instance Aghion and Tirole (1997) as well as Dessein (2002).
15 The project selection decision in my model may be interpreted more broadly as “fine-
tuning the firm’s course of action”. Imposing a given direction to the R&D process, forbid-
ding scientific publications related to the start-up’s R&D, replacing the original founder
with a more suited outside CEO: these are examples where VC interference may create
value ex post, but generates conflict and demotivates the founding entrepreneur ex ante.
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δen and δvc:
eV C(δen, δvc) =
λτδen + γ
1 + (γ − τδen) (1− λ)2τδvc
(9)
EV C(δen, δvc) =
(λτδen + γ) (1− λ)τδvc
1 + (γ − τδen) (1− λ)2τδvc
. (10)
It can be easily checked that ∂EV C/∂δvc > 0, ∂e
V C/∂δvc < 0. Increasing the riskiness of
the VC’s claim makes the VC more eager to monitor and interfere in the project selection
process. This reduces the entrepreneur’s incentives for information acquisition.16
3.3.2 Optimal cash flow rights
When the VC enjoys formal control over project selection, the investment generates a
surplus given by
V V C(e,E) = RL + p∆R− γ − I + e(λτ∆R+ γ) + eE(1− λ)(τ∆R− γ)−
(e)2
2
−
(E)2
2
.
(11)
The optimal cash-flow right allocation then solves the following program
max
e,E,RL
i
,δi,Ii
V V C(e,E)
s.t.
RLvc + pδvc + e[λ+E(1− λ)]τδvc −
E2
2
≥ Ivc, (12)
RLout + pδout + e[λ+E(1− λ)]τδout ≥ Iout, (13)
E = τ(1− λ)δvce, (14)
e = [λτδen + γ]− (γ − τδen) (1− λ)E, (15)
RLi ≥ 0, and R
L
i + δi ≥ 0, (16)
16 This is a straightforward extension of Burkart, Gromb and Panunzi’s (1997) result
that initiative is inhibited when voting equity is concentrated in the hands of a large
shareholder. However, in my setting – where the degree of dissonance between EN and
VC’s preferences is endogenous – the effect of δvc on initiative is magnified whenever a
higher δvc also increases the entrepreneur’s distaste for VC interference.
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where i = en, vc, out; the last two inequalities ensure limited liability holds.
To solve for the optimal cash flow allocation when the VC has formal control, I study
how the shape of the VC’s claim affects the surplus. Similarly to Burkart, Gromb and
Panunzi (1998), the effect of a more high-powered VC claim on the surplus depends on
the interplay between VC monitoring and EN initiative. To see this, it is useful to study
V V C(E), where e has been replaced in Equation (??) with the best reply eV C(E). The
effect of VC monitoring on firm value can then be decomposed in the following way:
dV V C
dE
=
∂V V C
∂E
+
∂V V C
∂e
de
dE
. (17)
The first term represents the control effect. Under VC control, increased monitoring
benefits the venture in that the VC exerts real control and imposes the first best project
more often. However, costly monitoring imposes private costs on the EN; therefore, the
control effect is positive if and only if e(1− λ)(τ∆R− γ) > E (i.e., E is not too high).
The second term represents the initiative effect. This effect is always negative: increased
monitoring discourages the EN’s information-gathering effort (de/dE < 0), which in turn
reduces the surplus, as ∂V V C/∂e > 0.
When the VC has high-powered incentives, both the initiative and the control effect are
negative. In other words, over-monitoring occurs due to the combined effect of two forces.
Monitoring kills entrepreneurial initiative, as in Burkart, Gromb and Panunzi (1997);
furthermore, excess costly monitoring is ex-post inefficient as in Pagano and Ro¨ell (1998).
This logic lies behind the following result:
Lemma 2. V V C is concave in E, and (dV V C/dE) < 0 whenever δvc ≥ ∆R− γ/τ .
The following Proposition shows that to optimally tackle the over-monitoring problem,
when the VC is granted control over project selection passive financiers must be involved
in funding the project. This allows to mitigate the power of the VC’s incentives and avoid
excess monitoring and interference. In this respect, pure (passive) financiers play the same
role as in Burkart, Gromb and Panunzi (1997).
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Proposition 2. The optimal cash flow right allocation under VC control is such that
δen < γ/τ , δvc < ∆R− γ/τ , and δout > 0. Hence, pure financiers are involved in the fi-
nancing of the venture: Iout > 0.
3.4 OPTIMAL CONTROL ALLOCATION WITH CONTRACTIBLE VC SUPPORT
We have shown that the optimal allocation of cash flow rights changes depending on
whether the formal control over project selection remains with the VC or the entrepreneur.
With entrepreneurial control, initiative is solely determined by the power of EN’s mon-
etary incentives, that in turn are limited by the need to generate enough income for
investors to break even. With VC control, entrepreneurial initiative, besides responding to
the entrepreneur’s monetary incentives, is also affected by the extent of VC monitoring:
monitoring kills initiative. However, in the benchmark case where VC support is con-
tractible, it is always possible to dilute the power of VC’s incentives for monitoring by
involving passive financiers as budget breakers. This suggests that VC control can do at
least as well as EN control, as the following proposition shows.
Proposition 3. Optimal contract when VC support is contractible – When VC
support is contractible, it is always optimal for the entrepreneur to relinquish formal con-
trol to the VC, have pure financiers co-finance the venture (Iout > 0), and sell the VC a
relatively safe financial claim in the start-up (δvc < ∆R−
γ
τ
).
Following Hart (1995), the optimal allocation of authority and cash flow rights in a
venture trades off ex-ante incentives with ex-post efficiency. In my model, ex-post effi-
ciency calls for VC control in that the VC always chooses the first best project, while the
entrepreneur may choose a suboptimal project when in control. On the other hand, under
VC control the entrepreneur’s incentives to gather information are reduced when a more
high-powered VC claim magnifies the venture capitalists’s interference. The solution is
then to allocate formal control rights to the venture capitalist while limiting the riskiness
of her financial claim and thus the extent of her real control.
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4. Optimal Contract When VC Support is Not Contractible
This section studies the optimal control and cash flow right allocation when VC support
cannot be contracted upon. The financial contract must be designed so as to cope with
the multiple moral hazard problems faced by the start-up at different stages of its life.
At t = 1, the main issue is to induce the EN and the VC to exert the optimal amount
of initiative and monitoring before a project is selected. Monitoring allows a controlling
VC to interfere in the company’s life, imposing that the efficient project is chosen at
t = 2; however, VC interference discourages entrepreneurial initiative. At t = 3, when the
selected project must be implemented, VC support and advice become crucial. The optimal
venture capital deal must then induce VC support while avoiding VC excess interference.
4.1 VC MORAL HAZARD AT THE IMPLEMENTATION STAGE
As in much of the literature on venture capital finance, I assume that the VC plays an
active role in determining a start-up’s success. It is a well documented fact that venture
capitalists are actively engaged in managing the firms they fund.17 Venture capitalists help
recruit key personnel, advise the entrepreneur on strategic decisions, provide introductions
to potential customers and suppliers. I define all these activities as VC support ; c is the
private benefit enjoyed by the VC when not providing support. An alternative interpre-
tation for VC’s moral hazard is the following. The venture capitalist may cannibalize the
project, for instance by stealing the entrepreneurial idea and using it in a competing ven-
ture. In this case, she gains a non-transferable benefit c but reduces the firm’s probability
of success by an amount p. The fear of idea expropriation is indeed a relevant concern for
innovative entrepreneurs.18
17 See for instance Gorman and Sahlman (1989), Sahlman (1990), Hellmann and Puri
(2002) and Cumming and Johan (2007).
18 The risk of value-destroying actions is perceived as very strong in the venture capital
world (see also the discussion in Section ??). For instance, here is Silver’s (1984) advice to
new entrepreneurs approaching a corporation’s venture capital arm: “beware of corporate
officers disguised as venture capitalists! Many are the corporations that attempt to kill
new companies whose products may become competitive.” Hellmann (2002) trades off this
cost with the benefits of corporate venture capital financing. In Ueda (2004), the dark side
of venture capital is the threat that the investor duplicates the project when intellectual
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In order that the venture capitalist supports the start-up at the project implementa-
tion stage, the cash flow splitting rule must satisfy the following incentive compatibility
constraint (ICvc):
δvc ≥
c
p
. (18)
In the following I assume that c is sizeable when compared with the scale of the project,
so that the pledgeable income compatible with (ICvc) is strictly larger than the investment
cost I.
Assumption 3. RL +
(
p+ (λτ∆R− λτ c
p
+ γ)λτ
) (
c
p
)
> I.
Assumption 3 has two implications. First, together with I > I1 it implies that c/p >
∆R− γ/τ ; this in turn implies (Lemma ??) that the need to incentivize VC support also
generates excess monitoring and interference when the VC has formal control over the
project selection. Assumption 3 also implies that when the contract is subject to (ICvc),
passive investors are not needed as budget breakers: even if they are involved in the
financing, they are not granted a risky claim. This is formalized in the following lemma.
Lemma 3. When VC support is not contractible, optimal cash flow rights under both
EN and VC control are such that δout = 0 and δen = ∆R− δvc.
4.2 OPTIMAL CONTROL AND CASH FLOW RIGHTS WHEN VC SUPPORT IS
NOT CONTRACTIBLE
In order to determine the optimal financial contract I analyze first how the allocation of
cash flow rights affects the firm surplus under, respectively, EN control and VC control.
We know that the project choice at t = 2 and information gathering efforts at t = 1 are
determined as in section 3’s benchmark. It is useful to emphasize that increasing the riski-
ness of the VC’s claim may have a twofold detrimental effect on entrepreneurial initiative.
property rights are weak. Finally, in Cestone and White (2003) a financial contract is
designed so as to commit the investor not to fund a competing firm.
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First, as δen = ∆R− δvc, a riskier VC claim comes at the expense of EN’s monetary in-
centives: ceteris paribus, a less high-powered claim provides the entrepreneur with less
incentives for costly information acquisition. This is a natural effect in a double-sided
moral hazard setting, and an effect that takes place under both EN and VC control. Sec-
ondly, a riskier claim makes the VC more eager to monitor and interfere in the project
selection process, further reducing the entrepreneur’s incentives for information acquisi-
tion.19 This second effect only takes place under VC control, which immediately implies
that: deV C/dδvc < de
EN/dδvc < 0.
The firm surplus under EN control is given by Equation (??), with e = λτ(∆R− δvc) +
γ, implying that V EN is strictly decreasing in δvc. The firm surplus under VC control is
instead given by Equation (??), with efforts e and E defined as in (??) and (??). To the
extent that δvc ≥ c/p > ∆R− γ/τ , it follows from Lemma ?? that (dV
V C/dE) < 0, hence
(dV V C/dδvc) < 0. This result is summarized in the following lemma.
Lemma 4. The surplus generated by the venture under both EN and VC control is a
decreasing function of δvc for all δvc ∈ [c/p,∆R].
Lemma ?? implies that under either control allocation, optimal cash flow rights make
(ICvc) binding: δvc = c/p. The following proposition establishes an important result that
will allow to compare the two formal control allocations for different levels of c.
Proposition 4. There exists a threshold δ̂ ∈
(
∆R− γ
τ
,∆R
]
such that V V C(δvc) >
V EN (δvc) if and only if δvc ∈ (∆R− γ/τ, δ̂).
As V EN and V V C are strictly decreasing in δvc, optimal cash flow rights under both
EN and VC control are such that (ICvc) binds: δvc = c/p. It follows immediately from
Proposition ?? that for any c ≥ ĉ ≡ δ̂p, EN control does better than VC control. This is
19 This is a straightforward extension of Burkart, Gromb and Panunzi’s (1997) result
that initiative is inhibited when voting equity is concentrated in the hands of a large
shareholder. However, in my setting (where the degree of dissonance between EN and
VC’s preferences is endogenous) the effect of δvc on initiative is magnified with respect to
their model, to the extent that a higher δvc also increases the entrepreneur’s distaste for
VC interference.
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Please insert figure 2 about here.
Fig. 2. Plot of V V C(δvc) and V
EN (δvc). The thick (thin) curve displays V
EN (δvc)
(V V C(δvc)).
because when c is large the cost of VC control in terms of over-monitoring and loss of
entrepreneurial initiative becomes too high, hence the more high-powered VC claim must
be associated with entrepreneurial control. This result is summarized in the following
proposition.
Proposition 5. – Risky Claims or Formal Control ? – When the cost of VC support
is large, it is optimal to grant formal control to EN: there exists a threshold value ĉ ∈
(0; p∆R] such that the financial contract maximizing the value of the venture is:
r if c < ĉ: VC has formal control, and δ∗vc =
c
p
r if c ≥ ĉ: EN has formal control and δ∗vc =
c
p
.
Figure 2 graphically illustrates Proposition ??. It displays the functions V V C(δvc) and
V EN (δvc) for the following values of the parameters: ∆R = 1, τ = 0.5, p = 0.5, λ = 0.5, γ =
0.3. Accordingly, the power of VC’s claim, δvc, varies between 0.4 and 1. The intersection
of the two curves defines the threshold δ̂, which takes here the value 0.6218. When δvc >
0.6218 (c > ĉ ∼= 0.31), entrepreneurial control does strictly better than VC’s control. It is
interesting to see how the threshold δ̂, and thus ĉ, change when larger values of γ are
selected, implying (i) smaller efficiency benefits of VC monitoring and (ii) a larger degree
of dissonance between the parties’ preferences (hence a larger impact of VC control on
initiative). Indeed, one would expect that ceteris paribus a larger γ makes EN control more
likely to dominate VC control. In line with this intuition, lower values of the threshold
δ̂ correspond to larger values of γ. For instance, for parameter values ∆R = 1, τ = 0.5,
p = 0.5, λ = 0.5, γ = 0.4 one finds δ̂ ∼= 0.35.
Remark 1 – Continuous VC support – In an online Appendix I study how cash
flow rights are optimally combined with control rights in the more general case where
VC support is a continuous variable. In this case, under both EN and VC control the
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over-monitoring costs of selling the VC a more high-powered claim must be traded off
against the benefit of increased VC support. Intuitively, due to the initiative effect, under
VC control the optimal level of δvc is smaller than under EN control. This confirms the
prediction that safer (riskier) VC claims should be associated with VC (EN) control.
Remark 2 – Stochastic control allocation – Proposition ?? derives the optimal
contract by restricting attention to deterministic allocations of control, and shows that EN
control is optimal when the need to give high-powered incentives to the VC induces exces-
sive monitoring and interference in the project selection stage. One may wonder whether a
less extreme result would obtain allowing for a probabilistic allocation of control.20 If the
initial contract states that VC will enjoy control over project selection with probability
x ∈ [0, 1], x could be reduced below 1 when c is large, thus reducing excessive interference
without sacrificing completely the efficiency benefits of VC control by switching to full
EN control (i.e. x = 0). One would then conjecture that in the optimum contract smaller
levels of x would correspond to larger values of c. Although it can be easily shown that
initiative (monitoring) is a decreasing (increasing) function of x, it is difficult to obtain
analytical results on the optimal level of x and its comparative statics with respect to c.
However, turning to numerical simulations, I find that interior solutions for x are never
optimal for the range of parameter values that I have considered: in all simulation results
x = 0 (i.e. full EN control) is optimal whenever c > ĉ. This would suggest that the benefit
of preserving entrepreneurial initiative is particularly strong and thus always dominates
the efficiency benefit of VC control, leading to a corner solution for x.
4.3 SECURITY DESIGN
The optimal contracts derived in the previous section consisted of a cash-flow splitting
rule
{
δvc, R
L
vc
}
and a formal control allocation. Here I illustrate how the optimal contract
can be implemented through financial instruments commonly observed in venture capital
deals.
20 A different question is how a probabilistic allocation of control can be implemented by
real life contracts. See Tirole (2006), on how different mechanisms, including the design
of incentives to exert real authority, can be viewed as a way to provide a more continuous
allocation of control in a contractual relationship.
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4.3.1 Case 1: High-powered VC claim with no control
When c ≥ ĉ, the optimal contract is such that the VC holds a high-powered financial
claim with no control attached. The VC’s payoffs in the good and bad state are, re-
spectively, δvc = c/p and R
L
vc = I −
[
p+ eENλτ
]
c/p, with eEN = λτ(∆R− c/p) + γ. The
entrepreneur’s payoffs are: RLen = R
L −RLvc > 0 and R
H
en = R
L
en + (∆R− c/p). I now in-
vestigate under which conditions the optimal cash-flow rights can be implemented by
giving common stock to the VC and preferred stock to the entrepreneur. By promising
a minimum dividend to EN, this arrangement ensures that a VC holding common stock
is not paid much in the low state; indeed, if for incentive purposes the VC grabs a large
part of the upside (∆R), her payment in the bad state must be reduced to ensure that
EN appropriates all the surplus from the venture.
Let r be the minimum dividend to be paid out to preferred stock, and (1− α) the
fraction of preferred stock held by the EN. α is the fraction of common stock issued to
VC. The distinction between common and preferred stock is meaningful provided r > (1−
α)RL (i.e., RL − r < αRL): when the project outcome is low, common stock holders are
residual claimants once the dividend r is paid to preferred. Also, it must be r < (1− α)RH :
when the outcome is good, common and preferred stocks receive the same dividend per
share. Therefore, the optimal contract is implemented by giving common (preferred) stock
to the VC (the EN), if and only the pair {r, α} satisfies the following conditions:
r = RL −RLvc, (19)
αRH = RLvc +
c
p
, (20)
(1− α)RL < r < (1− α)RH . (21)
It is easily checked that r < (1− α)RH whenever Equations (??) and (??) are satisfied.
However, a pair {r, α} solving (??) and (??) satisfies r > (1− α)RL if and only if the
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following condition holds:
I −
[
p+ eENλτ
] c
p
<
RL
∆R
c
p
. (22)
4.3.2 Case 2: Low-powered VC claim with control attached
When c < ĉ, the optimal contract gives VC formal control over the venture and a relatively
safe financial claim: δvc = c/p and R
L
vc = I −
[
p+ eV Cλτ + eV CEV C(1− λ)τ
]
c/p, with
eV C = eV C (c/p) and EV C = EV C (c/p). As VC captures a small part of the upside ∆R,
she must receive an adequate compensation in case of failure in order that she is willing
to fund the firm. This can be done by giving preferred stock to VC and common stock
to the entrepreneur.21 Let r be the minimum revenue to be paid to preferred stock and
α VC’s equity share. This contract implements the optimal cash-flow rights if it satisfies
r = RLvc, αR
H = RLvc + c/p, and αR
L < r, that is if c is sufficiently small:
I −
[
p+ eV Cλτ + eV CEV C(1− λ)τ
] c
p
>
RL
∆R
c
p
. (23)
5. Robustness and Extensions
5.1 OPTION CONTRACTS
The model so far has not allowed for option contracts in the spirit of Schmidt (2003). Yet,
a contract awarding the venture capitalist the right to buy control at a predetermined
price K after the information gathering stage might do better than outright EN control
or VC control. First, the prospect of receiving the transfer price K would encourage the
entrepreneur to exert initiative, to the extent that control has value only if the project pay-
offs have been discovered initially. Second, the option to buy control from the entrepreneur
would encourage the VC to exert monitoring, to the extent that control only has value if
21 Here I am arguing that an appropriate use of common stock and preferred stock may
implement the optimal cash-flow rights. Note however that the same cash-flow splitting
rule can be achieved by selling a combination of standard debt and equity to the VC.
Multiple security design interpretations of the optimal contract are standard when the
distribution of returns has a two-point support (a feature shared by many models of VC
contracting). Yet in venture capital deals, preferred stock, rather than a debt-equity mix,
seems to be the most common financial instrument used to give a party a debt-like claim.
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the VC is informed.22 In this section I allow for option contracts of this kind, and show
that the paper’s central result can be generalized. In fact, I find that the optimal contract
grants the EN formal control, with the provision that control can be bought by the VC at
a predetermined price after the information gathering stage. However, the transfer price
to be paid to buy control is strictly larger when the VC is sold a riskier claim – more
equity-like claims are associated with “less control”.
Note that control has no value to the VC unless two conditions hold: (i) the VC is
informed about project payoffs; (ii) project payoffs are such that preferences are dissonant.
The price K satisfies:
0 ≤ K ≤ τδvc.
When K = τδvc, the option to buy control is not in the money; this case corresponds to
outright EN control. When K = 0, the VC reclaims (and exercises) control whenever she is
informed and project payoffs are such that preferences are dissonant; this case corresponds
to outright VC control. One would expect a less extreme allocation of control to dominate
both outright EN and VC control, and a larger transfer price to be associated with a
riskier VC claim. The intuition is simple. Increasing K makes control more costly to buy
for the VC. This in turn boosts entrepreneurial information gathering incentives at t = 1,
while reducing the VC’s incentives for monitoring. Setting a higher transfer price is then
a tool to temper excess monitoring and spur entrepreneurial initiative when the need for
costly advice calls for a high-powered VC claim. This is formalized in proposition ??.
Proposition 6. When VC advice is non contractible, formal control is initially allocated
to the entrepreneur and the VC is granted an option to buy control at a price K∗ ∈ (0, τδvc).
The optimal exercise price K∗ is strictly increasing in the riskiness of the VC’s claim δvc.
5.2 RENEGOTIATION OF CONTROL RIGHTS
So far I have ruled out that control rights can be renegotiated after t = 1; this is equivalent
to assuming that the entrepreneur enjoys all the bargaining power when control rights
22 I am grateful to an anonymous Referee for providing these insights.
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are renegotiated. This hypothesis simplifies the analysis by ensuring that independently
of δvc, monitoring never occurs under EN control. I now discuss the robustness of my
main predictions to a more even allocation of bargaining power when control rights are
renegotiated.23
Consider the case of EN control and suppose both parties have become informed about
project payoffs. Whenever preferences are not congruent, the EN will accept to select the
efficient project in exchange for a monetary transfer T that compensates him for any loss
due to the dissonant project choice:
T ≥ γ − τ (∆R− δvc) .
Of course, the VC will be ready to pay a transfer T ≤ τδvc. As τ∆R− γ > 0, there
are gains from trade to be shared and renegotiation occurs. Anticipating this, the VC
may have an incentive to monitor (and thus enjoys some real control) even when for-
mal control rights are allocated to the EN initially.24 Interestingly, the parties’ best
replies in information gathering under EN control are now both upward sloped provided
T ∈ (γ − τ∆R+ τδvc, τδvc):
EEN (e) = (1− λ)(τδvc − T )e
eEN (E) = [λτ(∆R− δvc) + γ] + (1− λ) (τ∆R− τδvc − γ + T )E.
Under EN control the entrepreneur has more incentives to gather information when the
VC exerts more monitoring, to the extent that only when both parties are informed EN is
in a position to grab the transfer T out of renegotiation. Hence, while under VC control
monitoring kills entrepreneurial initiative, under EN control monitoring spurs initiative.
Intuitively, this should not undermine (and rather reinforce) the paper’s central prediction
23 Note that no renegotiation of control rights occurs under VC control. Hence, the results
on how monitoring, initiative and firm value respond to the design of cash flow rights under
VC control are unchanged.
24 In earlier models on formal versus real authority (see e.g., Aghion and Tirole, 1997) the
principal never enjoys any real control when formal control is allocated to the agent. This
is because in these models the agent only cares about private benefits and thus cannot be
brought to renegotiate control rights.
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that high-powered VC incentives are more likely to be associated with EN control than
with VC control.
Please insert figure 3 about here.
Fig. 3. Plot of V V C(δvc) and V
EN (δvc) when gains from renegotiating control
rights are equally split. The thick (thin) curve displays V EN (δvc) (V
V C(δvc)).
When T ∈ (γ − τ∆R+ τδvc, τδvc) analytical results are difficult to obtain, therefore
I turn to numerical simulations, focusing on the case where the gains from renegotiat-
ing control rights are equally split between the parties. I here discuss in particular the
results obtained for the following parameter values: ∆R = 1, τ = 0.5, p = 0.5, λ = 0.5,
γ = 0.3. In line with the basic model, in the interval δvc ∈ [∆R− γ/τ,∆R] the func-
tion eV C(δvc) takes smaller values and is steeper than e
EN (δvc). I analyze how choos-
ing increasing levels of δvc in [∆R− γ/τ,∆R] affects the value of the venture under
VC control and under EN control, and compare V V C and V EN for different levels of
δvc. Figure 3 displays V
V C(δvc) (thin curve) and V
EN (δvc) (thick curve). By inspection,
V V C(0.4) = 0.3473 > 0.3471 = V EN (0.4). The two curves intersect at δ̂ = 0.459087, the
threshold above which EN control dominates VC control. The simulations have been ex-
tended to encompass the following changes in parameter values: γ ∈ {0.25, 0.35, 0.4, 0.45}
and λ ∈ (0.3, 0.4, 0.6, 0.7).25 The results obtained are qualitatively similar to the main
findings in the paper: in all simulations VC control dominates EN control (EN control
dominates VC control) at low (high) levels of δvc. Also, and in line with economic intu-
ition, the threshold δ̂ becomes smaller when larger levels of γ are set in the model. To
conclude, the simulations performed validate the claim that the central prediction of the
paper (i.e., high-powered VC incentives are more likely to be associated with EN control
than with VC control) is robust to renegotiation.
25 To the extent that both the efficiency benefits of VC monitoring and the degree of
dissonance between VC and EN’s preferences vary dramatically with γ and λ, it is sensible
to conjecture that the model implications are particularly sensitive to variations in these
two parameters.
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5.3 EARLY PROFITABILITY SIGNALS AND CONTINGENT CONTROL
Venture capital deals make an extensive use of contingencies. Gompers (1999) and Kaplan
and Stro¨mberg (2003) report that cash-flow rights, control rights and disbursements of
additional finance are made contingent upon observable measures of performance. Perfor-
mance milestones are both financial (e.g. the attainment of a minimum level of short term
earnings or net worth) and non-financial (patent approval, Federal Drug Administration
approval for new drugs). Along the life of a start-up, the parties’ rights typically evolve in
the following way: at the initial stage of financing the VC usually enjoys control, but as
early performance milestones are attained VC loses her superior voting, board and liqui-
dation rights. Also, upon attainment of performance targets, the VC’s preferred stock is
converted into common stock. This contingent allocation of cash-flow and control rights
can be rationalized in an extension of the basic model.
Assume that during the start-up’s life two non-contractible actions must be taken in
sequence. The first is the project selection; the second (the “interim action”) represents
all further decisions that may enhance profitability. Before each decision is made, both
parties gather information on the payoffs attached to all alternative courses of action. The
timing is as follows (see Figure 4). After the contract is signed, information gathering on
project payoffs takes place (t = 1), and at t = 2 a project is chosen as in the basic model.
Then, an early signal accrues about the profitability of the project adopted. The signal is
verifiable. At t = 3, after the signal realization, the VC provides support to the start-up;
simultaneously, both VC and EN gather information about the interim action. At t = 4
the interim action is selected. Finally, payoffs are realized. I define the period between the
initial financing and the signal realization as the seed stage; the start-up stage takes place
after the signal occurs and until the payoffs are realized.26 I assume that VC support is
26 The British Venture Capital Association identifies four crucial stages in a company’s
development. At the seed stage, VC finance “allows a business idea to be developed,
perhaps involving the production of a business plan, prototypes and additional research,
prior to bringing a product to market...” The start-up stage is “to develop the company’s
products and fund their initial marketing.” In a further early stage the company may
“initiate commercial manufacturing and sales...but may not yet be generating profits.”
Finally, at the expansion stage, the VC may provide finance “to grow and expand an
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a continuous variable as in Remark 1. To simplify matters, I assume the entrepreneur is
not responsive to monetary incentives.27
Please insert figure 4 about here.
Fig. 4. Time line
The initial contract must allocate control rights over both actions, as well as cash-flow
rights over the final profit. Both the cash-flow rights and the formal control over the second
action can be made contingent upon the verifiable signal of project profitability. At t = 1,
incentives for information gathering and for project selection crucially depend on how
control and cash-flow rights change upon attainment of a good (bad) signal.
5.3.1 The start-up stage
The paper’s bottom line implies that the optimal claim to be held by the venture capitalist
depends on who has formal control on the interim action. As argued in Remark 1, when
VC advice/support is continuous, under EN control the VC should hold a risky claim that
induces a high level of support. Under VC control, a trade off arises between VC support
and VC interference, hence it is optimal to limit the riskiness of VC’s claim. This implies
that if control over the interim action is contingent upon the signal, cash-flow rights should
be made contingent as well.
Define UENen the entrepreneur’s second-round utility when he has formal control on the
second action, and UV Cen the entrepreneur’s second-round utility when the VC has formal
control.
established company.”. Usually, these early stages are followed by an exit stage where the
firm is brought to the market through an IPO. For a complete description of the venture
capital process, from investment to exit, see also Gompers and Lerner (1999). I do not
explicitly model exit as this lies beyond the scope of the paper. Hence, my model cannot
provide a theory for the use of contingencies like the outcome or the timing of an IPO.
See Aghion, Bolton and Tirole (2004) for an optimal contracting model analyzing exit
provisions in venture capital financing.
27 One may assume that EN enjoys a large private benefit from running the firm, and
thus is willing to start a venture even if he has to bear the costs of information gathering
and of project implementation.
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5.3.2 The seed stage
Project selection takes place at the seed stage and is not reversible at a later stage. The
N + 1 available projects have different probabilities of success (pa+ τk) and private costs
(γk) for the entrepreneur. Let me slightly generalize the basic model by assuming that
one project (N − 2) has disastrous consequences for the firm (τN−2 = −pa) but gives a
private benefit b to the entrepreneur (γN−2 = −b). When project (N − 2) is available, EN’s
and VC’s preferences over projects are never congruent, as EN invariably prefers project
(N − 2) to any other project. Hence, VC should have formal control at the seed stage, as
she always chooses the profit-enhancing project while EN never does.
There is a problem, though. If the VC has formal control over t = 2 project selection,
even if uninformed she never rubber stamps the entrepreneur’s proposal. Indeed, if EN
proposes a project, this must be his favorite one, namely, the value-destroying project
(N − 2). As his proposal will never be accepted, EN has no incentive to gather information
at t = 1. To put it in other words, “the key to entrepreneurial real control (and thus
initiative) is congruence” (Tirole, 2000). If the EN’s preferences are never congruent with
the investor’s objectives, his proposals are never rubber-stamped, which completely kills
initiative as a result. To partially realign the EN’s preferences over projects with investor
objectives, a contingent control allocation at the start-up stage may be called for.
Assume that early performance variables realized after t = 2 signal whether a value-
destroying project was chosen: if (N − 2) is selected, a bad signal (L) accrues. If any other
project is selected, signal L only accrues with probability (1− ξ), while with probability
ξ > 0 a good signal (H) accrues. A contract allocating start-up stage control to the en-
trepreneur if the signal is good, and to the venture capitalist if the signal is bad can ensure
that the EN - when informed - never proposes project (N − 2) at the seed stage.28 This
is the case if:
ξUENen + (1− ξ)U
V C
en ≥ b+ U
V C
en
28 This “carrot-and-stick” view of contingent control is in line with Dewatripont and
Tirole (1994), who argue that shifting control to tough investors after bad performance is
a way to discipline managers when monetary incentives are costly to provide.
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or:
UENen − U
V C
en ≥
b
ξ
which holds whenever entrepreneurial benefits of control over the interim action are large
enough relative to the benefits of control over project selection. By realigning EN’s pref-
erences with VC’s, contingent start-up stage control allows to grant seed-stage control to
the venture capitalist (as is efficient), and yet preserve entrepreneurial initiative at t = 1.
The contingent allocation of control and cash-flow rights delineated so far can be im-
plemented in the following way. In the optimal contingent contract the venture capitalist
holds superior control rights at the close of the financing and takes convertible preferred
equity in the firm. When a good interim signal of profitability is observed, control is shifted
back to the founding entrepreneur, and VC’s preferred stock is converted into common.
If a bad signal is observed, VC keeps control of the firm and her preferred stock is not
converted.
6. Empirical Predictions and Evidence
In this paper I have shown that an innovative start up selling a venture capital investor
a high-powered financial claim to spur costly support should limit the VC’s control rights
in the venture. This is because a high-powered claim associated with control rights spurs
excessive VC interference, thus killing entrepreneurial initiative. I here discuss three main
predictions that can be drawn from my theory and how they relate with existing empirical
evidence.
First, my results challenge the textbook corporate finance assumption that riskier
claims, such as common equity, should always be associated with more control rights.
Indeed, the model predicts that when both entrepreneurial initiative and VC support are
central to a company’s success, very risky claims should be granted fewer control rights,
while more control rights can be attached to relatively safe claims such as preferred equity.
Recent empirical evidence seems to corroborate this claim. Relying on a large sample of
VC funds in continental Europe, Cumming and Johan (2007) observe a negative correla-
tion between VC control rights and the sensitivity of VC claims to company performance
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(“VCs typically have fewer control rights with common equity, and more control rights
when mixes of preferred and common are used.”).
The paper’s prediction that riskier claims should have less control attached rests on
the importance of both EN initiative and VC advice in innovative ventures. While en-
trepreneurial initiative is also central in traditional corporate finance settings, the valuable
support and advising services delivered by venture capitalists are not generally provided
by other large shareholders. This explains why the hybrid financial claims (i.e., common
stock with limited control attached) devised in venture capital contracts are not commonly
observed in other corporate financial arrangements.29
A second prediction of the paper is that the combination of high-powered claims and
weak control rights should be more common among investors who face a high opportunity
cost in supporting the success of a portfolio company (i.e., VCs for which c is large). A
widespread perception in the business community is that corporate venture funds display
this feature to a larger extent than independent venture capitalists. Indeed, rather than
supporting the portfolio company, corporate VCs may “cannibalize” its idea and let the
information shared at various stages of the venture be exploited by the parent house
(see Silver, 1984 and Hellmann, 2002). This explains why entrepreneurs often express
concerns about confidentiality when dealing with corporate VCs. In line with my theory,
many corporate venturing programs have adopted an “hands-off approach” to protect
entrepreneurs. Gompers and Lerner (1999) document for instance that many corporate
VCs do not take board seats in portfolio firms.30
29 In other words, in more traditional settings entrepreneurs willing to preserve their own
incentives by limiting large shareholder interference can opt for dispersed ownership, as
in Burkart, Gromb and Panunzi (1997). Conversely, in VC environments entrepreneurs
may not be eager to reduce their investor’s monetary incentives, as this would reduce VC
support/advice. Therefore, they may have to resort to a combination of risky VC claim
and limited VC control.
30 Gompers and Lerner (2000) also find that corporate venture investors pay higher valu-
ations, hence taking smaller equity stakes than independent venture capitalists. This may
be because corporate VCs include in their valuations the strategic benefits generated by
the venture for the parent company (Hellmann, 2002), or compensate entrepreneurs ex
ante for the larger risk of idea expropriation. As a typical corporate VC share is smaller,
in order to motivate the VC to support the venture it is even more important to give her
higher-powered incentives. This can be achieved by selling the VC common rather than
preferred stock and avoiding granting the VC any downside protection.
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Corporate VCs may also have a lower cost of monitoring the start up’s research pro-
cess, especially when due diligence and early monitoring are performed by scientists at
the parent company who are particularly knowledgeable of the start up’s research area.
In my model, this would imply that – for given cash flow rights – corporate VCs have
more tendency to interfere in the project selection. The contraposition between spurring
VC support at a later stage and avoiding excess interference at the early stage is thus
exacerbated, which strengthens my prediction that corporate VCs should be allocated
less control rights than independent VCs. Of course, some corporate VCs may resort to
other commitment devices to reduce the potential conflict with portfolio companies, which
would reduce the need to limit their control rights. My theory suggests that in these cases
corporate VCs may attach more control rights to their equity. One interesting case study
is that of Lilly Ventures, the corporate VC arm of Eli Lilly (see Hamermesh et al., 2007).
When performing due diligence on a biotech start-up called Protagonist in late 2005,
Lilly Ventures signed a confidentiality and disclosure agreement “to reassure the company
that any information shared in the due-diligence process would not be used to benefit
Lilly.” To this aim, the VC team even chose to hire external consultants, rather than Lilly
scientists, to perform some parts of the scientific due-diligence process. More generally,
Lilly Ventures’ management emphasizes that it is well aware of entrepreneur’s concerns
about confidentiality and loss of control, hence it always tries to establish a “Chinese wall”
between the portfolio company and Lilly when requesting to have any seats on the board.
Partnership deals between biotech start-ups and big drug companies are plagued by
similar problems as in corporate VC deals. Leading drug firms may be helpful financiers
when it comes to advising biotech research, or performing the costly stages of testing and
manufacturing a newly discovered drug. However, a controlling corporate partner willing
to keep an eye on new discoveries may be tempted to appropriate the good ones or destroy
the ones that compete with its leading drugs. Apparently, scared by excess interference
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and the risk of cannibalization, biotech start-ups have traditionally been cautious when
writing such “window-on-technology” deals.31
The third prediction that can be drawn from my paper is that in VC deals where control
allocation is contingent on performance milestones, control rights and the riskiness of cash
flow rights should be negatively correlated along the life of the venture. This is in line with
the evidence (Gompers, 1999 and Kaplan and Stro¨mberg, 2003) that upon attainment of
milestones VCs usually lose their superior control rights while their preferred stock is
converted into common stock. In a significant number of cases, such conversion occurs
automatically once the performance milestone is attained, and thus it is not an option
offered to the venture capitalist.32 My theory offers a framework to explain why the venture
capitalist should lose control exactly at the time when her preferred stock is converted into
common stock.33 Within this framework, the need for automatic conversion clauses can
also be rationalized, to the extent that the shift to entrepreneurial control (implying that
suboptimal project choices will occur) can make the VC wary of converting her preferred
equity into common in spite of a good interim performance signal accruing.34 In this
respect, my model also adds to the few financial contracting theories (to my knowledge,
31 As reported in The Economist (August 29th, 1992), “...when a big drug firm buys a
controlling stake in a biotech firm, it is usually careful to let the firm’s founders continue
to run it.”
32 Automatic conversion occurs in 38% of the contracts in Gomper’s sample. Conversion
is contingent on profit or sales benchmarks, as well as on an initial public offering. See
however Kaplan and Stro¨mberg (2003), who argue that automatic conversion contingent
on profits or sales is less common.
33 Several papers have provided a rationale for the use of convertible securities. In a first
set of papers, control allocation is neglected and convertibles only implement a contingent
allocation of cash-flows (see for instance Green, 1984, Biais and Casamatta, 1999, Schmidt,
2003, Cornelli and Yosha, 2003). In other models, convertibles serve to allocate contingent
control rights to the parties (see Berglo¨f, 1994 and Kalai and Zender, 1997), however
conversion of a debt-like claim into equity is always associated to an increase in control.
Finally, Hellmann (2006) develops a theory to account for the use of convertible preferred
equity and contingent control rights in venture capital. His theory focuses on control on
the exit decision rather than on early project selection, and rationalizes the use of late
contingencies (IPOs rather than earlier performance milestones), hence it can be viewed
as complementary to my model.
34 By contrast, in most existing models conversion is ex post optimal for the venture
capitalist once a good signal accrues. This is for instance the case in models where the
conversion of preferred stock into common serves to signal good prospects to outside
investors (see e.g., Dess´ı, 2005).
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only Schmidt, 2003 and Hellmann, 2006) that offer an explanation for the use of automatic
conversion clauses.
7. Conclusion
This paper contributes to the strand of literature that studies the optimal joint allocation
of cash-flow rights and control rights between entrepreneurs and venture capitalists (see
Hellmann, 1998 and 2006, Schindele, 2004 and Dess´ı, 2005). In a model with sequential
moral hazard, I show that when the need for costly VC advice and support calls for a
high-powered outside claim, the entrepreneur should optimally retain control in order to
preserve his incentives to engage in costly information acquisition.
My theory challenges the common idea that more equity-like claims (e.g. common stock)
should always come with more control rights, as is the case in standard securities. In line
with my results, venture capital contracts, corporate venturing deals, and sophisticated
partnership deals between biotech start-ups and big drug companies often display a nega-
tive correlation between control rights and the sensitivity of claims to firm outcomes. My
theory also explains the use – documented in Gompers (1999) and Kaplan and Stro¨mberg
(2003) – of contingent contracts where the investor’s superior control rights are reduced
and her preferred stock is automatically converted into common upon attainment of early
performance milestones.
Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1: The proof consists in showing that no contract specifying τδen ≥ γ can
satisfy investors’ participation constraints if I > I1. Assume the VC investor accepts a
contract stating cash flow rights: RLvc = R
L, δvc = ∆R− γ/τ , R
L
en = 0, δen = γ/τ . Then,
EN’s and VC’s preferences over projects are perfectly aligned, and control allocation is ir-
relevant: project N − 1 is always selected at t = 2 irrespective of who holds formal control.
At t = 1, the entrepreneur chooses effort e to maximize:
e
(
τ
γ
τ
+ λγ
)
−
e2
2
,
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hence e = γ(1 + λ) < λτ∆R+ γ, and the income that can be credibly pledged to the
investor at t = 0 is RL + (p+ γ(1 + λ)τ)(∆R− γ/τ). Define
I1 ≡ R
L + (p+ γ(1 + λ)τ)
(
∆R−
γ
τ
)
. (A1)
It is immediate that whenever I > I1, a contract specifying cash flow rights R
L
vc = R
L,
δvc = ∆R− γ/τ does not satisfy the VC investor’s participation constraint. A fortiori,
when I > I1 no other contract setting δen ≥ γ/τ (and thus inducing congruent preferences)
can satisfy the investor’s participation constraint.
Proof of Proposition 1: Substituting e = λτ(∆R− δI) + γ in (??), and differentiating
with respect to δI , one obtains:
dV EN
dδI
=
dV EN
de
de
dδI
= (λτ∆R+ γ − e) (−λτ) = −λ2τ2δI < 0.
It follows that the optimal contract must minimize the combined riskiness of investors’
claims, δI , subject to the investors’ break-even constraint: the income pledged to investors
equals the funds provided:
RLI + pδI + (λτ(∆R− δI) + γ)λτδI = I. (A2)
At the optimum RLI = R
L, hence RLen = 0. If not, it would be possible to increase R
L
I and
reduce δI – thus increasing the surplus – while keeping Equation (??) satisfied. Under
the model assumptions, the pledgeable income under EN control, PIEN = RL + pδI +
(λτ(∆R− δI) + γ)λτδI , is increasing in δI , ∀δI ∈ [0,∆R]. It follows immediately that the
optimal δI is the smallest root of Equation (??).
Proof of Lemma 2: To simplify the notation, I defineX ≡ τ∆R− γ and e∗ ≡ λτ∆R+ γ,
hence:
V V C(E) = RL + p∆R− γ − I + e∗eV C(E) + (1− λ)XEeV C(E)−
(
eV C(E)
)2
2
−
E2
2
.
Differentiating V V C with respect to E, and using deV C/dE = −(1− λ) (γ − τ(∆R− δI)):
dV V C
dE
=
∂V V C
∂E
+
∂V V C
∂e
deV C
dE
(A3)
= eV C(E)(1− λ)X −E +
(
e∗ + (1− λ)XE − eV C(E)
)
(− (γ − τ(∆R− δI)) (1− λ)) .
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Replacing into the above expression eV C(E) = eEN − (1− λ) (γ − τ(∆R− δI))E, one ob-
tains:
dV V C
dE
= eEN (1− λ)X − (γ − τ(∆R− δI)) (1− λ)
2XE −E − (γ − τ(∆R− δI)) (1− λ)e
∗ (A4)
− (γ − τ(∆R− δI)) (1− λ)
2XE + eEN (γ − τ(∆R− δI)) (1− λ)− (γ − τ(∆R− δI))
2 (1− λ)2E.
The second derivative is then:
d2V V C
dE2
= −2 (γ − τ(∆R− δI)) (1− λ)
2X − ((γ − τ(∆R− δI)))
2 (1− λ)2 − 1 < 0.
Let us now study the sign of dV V C/dE. We know that the initiative effect
(∂V V C/∂e)/(de/dE) is always strictly negative. Using the best reply function EV C =
e(1− λ)τδvc to replace E into the control effect ∂V
V C/∂E = e(1− λ)(τ∆R− γ)−E, one
obtains
∂V V C
∂E
= e(1− λ)(τ∆R− γ − τδvc) ≤ 0, ∀δvc ≥ ∆R−
γ
τ
.
It follows that dV V C/dE < 0, ∀δvc ∈
[
∆R− γ
τ
,∆R
]
.
Proof of Proposition 2: The proof is by contradiction, and involves two steps.
r Define pledgeable income net of monitoring costs under VC control as:
PIV C(δvc, δen, δout) = R
L + p(δvc + δout) + e[λ+E(1− λ)]τ(δvc + δout)−
E2
2
,
where e = eV C(δvc, δen) and E = E
V C(δvc, δen) as in Equations (??) and (??).
Suppose δout = Iout = 0, hence δvc = δI and δen = ∆R− δI . Define δˆI as the
smaller root of the equation PIV C(δI ,∆R− δI , 0) = I. Note that δˆI > ∆R− γ/τ .
This follows from two facts: (i) when δout = 0, δvc = ∆R− γ/τ , δen = γ/τ , it is
PIV C < I1 < I; and (ii) PI
V C is strictly increasing in δI .
r I now show that δout = Iout = 0, δvc = δˆI > ∆R− γ/τ cannot be an optimum. Sup-
pose the contract sets δvc > ∆R− γ/τ : it is possible to reduce δvc and increase δout
so as to keep δen constant, while keeping investors’ break-even constraints satisfied.
This will reduce monitoring E and, by Lemma ??, it will increase the surplus V V C .
It follows that at the optimum it is δout > 0 and Iout > 0: a pure financier must be
involved in the deal.
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Proof of Proposition 3: If VC support is contractible, VC control weakly dominates
EN control: the surplus attained under EN formal control can always be replicated by
granting the VC formal control attached to a flat claim, so that the VC never exercises
any real control. Formally, setting δvc = 0, δout = δI under VC control, one gets E
V C = 0,
eV C = eEN , and V V C = V EN . Indeed, it can be checked that VC control does strictly
better than EN control whenever the efficiency gains from VC control (τ∆R− γ) are
large relative to the firm’s financing needs (I). Then, the optimal contract allocates formal
control to the VC, and provides her with incentives to exercise some monitoring and real
control: δvc ∈ (0,∆R− γ/τ).
Proof of Lemma 3: Assume δout > 0. Assumption 3 and (ICvc) imply that under both
VC and EN control, pledgeable income is strictly larger than the investment cost I. It
is then possible to reduce δout and increase δen, while keeping (ICvc) and the investors’
participation constraints satisfied. Under any control allocation, an increase in δen ceteris
paribus increases firm surplus.
Proof of Proposition 4: To compare the value of the venture under VC and EN control
for any given level of δvc, I study the function H(δvc) ≡ V
V C(δvc)− V
EN (δvc), that can
be decomposed in the following way: H(δvc) = L(δvc) +M(δvc), where:
L(δvc) ≡
(
eV C(λτ∆R+ γ)−
(eV C)2
2
)
−
(
eEN (λτ∆R+ γ)−
(eEN )2
2
)
and
M(δvc) ≡ e
V CEV C(1− λ)(τ∆R− γ)−
(EV C)2
2
.
The proof is in three steps.
r The function L(δvc) captures the dark side of VC control as compared with EN
control: entrepreneurial initiative under VC control is ceteris paribus lower than
initiative under EN control:
eV C < eEN , ∀δvc > ∆R−
γ
τ
.
This, together with eEN < λτ∆R+ γ, implies that L(δvc) < 0 ∀δvc > ∆R− γ/τ .
Furthermore, L(∆R− γ/τ) = 0, as eV C = eEN when δvc = ∆R− γ/τ . In fact, only
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when there is a discrepancy between the entrepreneur’s preferred project and the
VC’s preferred project – as measured by the distance γ − τ(∆R− δvc) – a “control-
kill-initiative effect” a` la Burkart, Gromb and Panunzi (1997) shows up under VC
control. Note also that the distance between eV C and eEN is increasing as δvc
grows. Formally: deV C/dδvc < de
EN/dδvc < 0. This in turn implies:
dL
dδvc
= [(λτ∆R+ γ)− eV C ]
deV C
dδvc
− [(λτ∆R+ γ)− eEN ]
deEN
dδvc
< 0.
r The function M(δvc) represents the benefit of VC control net of monitoring costs.
Using the best reply function EV C = τ(1− λ)δvce
V C , one can write:
M(δvc) = E
V CeV C
(
(1− λ)(τ∆R− γ)−
τ(1− λ)δvc
2
)
,
implying that M(δvc) ≤ 0 if δvc ≥ 2 (∆R− γ/τ). Secondly, as VC and EN’s pref-
erences are dissonant when γ > τ(∆R− δvc), it is limδvc→(∆R−γ/τ)+ M(δvc) > 0.
Third, from lemma ?? we know that for all δvc ≥ ∆R− γ/τ , the net benefits of
VC control are decreasing in E. This, together with dEV C/dδvc > 0 , implies that
dM
dδvc
< 0 ∀δvc ≥ ∆R−
γ
τ
.
r From the two previous steps it follows that: (i) limδvc→(∆R−γ/τ)+ H(δvc) > 0; (ii)
H(δvc) < 0 at δvc = 2(∆R− γ/τ); (iii) dH/dδvc < 0, ∀δvc ≥ ∆R− γ/τ . As H is
continuous, it follows that there exists a threshold value δ̂ ∈
(
∆R− γ
τ
,∆R
]
such
that V V C > V EN if and only if δvc ∈ (∆R− γ/τ, δ̂).
Proof of Proposition 6: When the VC holds an option to buy control at price K, the
incentive compatibility constraints for information gathering are:
e ∈ argmax
e
RLen + (p+ eλτ)(∆R− δvc)− (1− e)γ + eE(1− λ) (K + τ(∆R− δvc)− γ)−
e2
2
,
E ∈ argmax
E
RLvc + (p+ eλτ)δvc + eE(1− λ)(τδvc −K)−
E2
2
.
Hence, the reaction functions in information gathering efforts are:
eO(E) = (λτ(∆R− δvc) + γ) + (1− λ) (K + τ(∆R− δvc)− γ)E (A5)
EO(e) = (1− λ) (τδvc −K) e. (A6)
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Note that initiative is now increasing in monitoring if K > γ − τ(∆R− δvc), that is if
the option exercise price more than compensates the entrepreneur for the loss of control;
otherwise, e is decreasing in monitoring as under outright VC control, with higher levels
of K alleviating the monitoring-kills-initiative effect. When instead K = γ − τ(∆R− δvc),
initiative is independent of monitoring as in the outright EN control case, and eO = eEN .
Equilibrium effort levels eO(K, δvc) and E
O(K, δvc) can be derived from the above, and
tedious calculations show that ∂EO/∂K < 0, ∂EO/∂δvc > 0 and ∂
2EO/∂K∂δvc < 0.
The contractual design problem boils down to choosing a transfer price K and a
level of δvc that maximize the surplus V = R
L + p∆R− γ − I + e(λτ∆R+ γ) + eE(1−
λ)(τ∆R− γ)− (e)2/2− (E)2/2, subject to (??), (??), and (ICvc). Note that the effect of
K on the surplus can be decomposed in the following way:
dV
dK
=
(
∂V
∂e
∂eO
∂E
+
∂V
∂E
)(
∂EO
∂K
)
+
∂V
∂e
∂eO
∂K
. (A7)
A larger exercise price reduces VC monitoring (∂EO/∂K < 0), and this in turn has an
initiative effect and a control effect on V . The last term in (??) represents instead the
direct impact of the exercise price on initiative and value, and it is strictly positive provided
K < τδvc; at K = τδvc the option to buy control is never exercised, hence an increase in
K does not spur initiative.
Replacing eO(E) in the initiative effect one obtains:
∂V
∂e
∂eO
∂E
= (λτ∆R+ γ − e+E(1− λ)(τ∆R− γ))
∂eO
∂E
= (λτδvc + (1− λ)E(τδvc −K))
∂eO
∂E
,
that is positive if ∂eO/∂E > 0, that is iff K ≥ γ − τ(∆R− δvc).
Replacing EO(e) in the control effect, one obtains
∂V
∂E
= e(1− λ) (K + τ∆R− τδvc − γ) ,
that is positive iff K ≥ γ − τ(∆R− δvc). It follows from the above that V achieves its
maximum at K∗ ∈ (γ − τ(∆R− δvc), τδvc). Moreover, from τ∆R > γ and (c/p) > ∆R−
γ/τ it follows that γ − τ(∆R− δvc) ∈ (0, τδvc): therefore, neither outright VC control nor
outright EN control is optimal.
Next, I show that K∗ is increasing in δvc. We know that dV/dK is equal to zero at
K = K∗. Using the implicit function theorem and the concavity of V , dK∗/dδvc can be
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signed by signing the mixed partial derivative:
∂2V
∂K∂δvc
=
∂
∂E
(
∂V
∂e
∂e
∂E
+
∂V
∂E
)
∂E
∂δvc
∂E
∂K
+
(
∂V
∂e
∂e
∂E
+
∂V
∂E
)
∂2E
∂K∂δvc
+
∂V
∂e
(1− λ)
∂E
∂δvc
.
We know that (∂V/∂e)(∂e/∂E) + ∂V/∂E is positive at K∗, and by Lemma ?? it is de-
creasing in E. Hence, ∂2V/∂K∂δvc is positive, implying that K
∗ is increasing in δvc.
Supplementary Material
Supplementary material is available at Review of Finance online.
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Continuous VC support
I analyze here the more general case where VC support is a continuous variable: at
t = 3 the VC exerts an unobservable advising effort a ∈ [0, 1]. Let cA(.) be the disutility
of this effort and assume:
cA(a) =
a2
2
.
Any project k succeeds with probability qk(a), where
qk(a) = ap+ τk,
and τk ∈ {0; τ}. I also assume that the surplus generated by the venture is negative unless
a minimal level of advice amin is provided:
amin ≡ p
(
∆R−
γ
τ
)
,
hence VC incentives must be sufficiently high-powered: δvc ≥ ∆R− γ/τ . The venture cap-
italist’s choice of effort at t = 3 is determined by the first order condition (ICvc):
a = pδvc, (A1)
which implies that VC support is increasing in the riskiness of VC’s claim δvc.
I now study the optimal design of the VC claim under EN control (δENvc ) and under VC
control (δV Cvc ). Under EN control, the firm surplus is:
V EN = RL − γ − I + ap∆R+ eEN [λτ∆R+ γ]−
(eEN )2
2
−
a2
2
,
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where a = pδvc and e
EN = λτ(∆R− δvc) + γ. Differentiating with respect to δvc one ob-
tains:
dV EN
dδvc
=
∂V EN
∂a
da
dδvc
+
∂V EN
∂e
deEN
dδvc
. (A2)
The first term represents the support effect : a riskier claim benefits the start-up by in-
creasing VC’s incentives to provide support at stage 3. This effect is always positive as
δvc ≤ ∆R. The second term is negative: EN initiative is reduced if a more high-powered
claim is sold to the VC (making the EN’s claim less high-powered).
Under VC control, the surplus is:
V V C = RL − γ − I + ap∆R+ eV C [λτ∆R+ γ] + eV CEV C(1− λ) [τ∆R− γ]−
(eV C)2
2
−
(EV C)2
2
−
a2
2
,
where a = pδvc and e = e
V C(δvc), E = E
V C(δvc) as defined in section 3.3 of the paper.
Differentiating with respect to δvc:
dV V C
dδvc
=
∂V V C
∂a
da
dδvc
+
∂V V C
∂e
deV C
dδvc
+
∂V V C
∂E
dEV C
dδvc
. (A3)
(+) (−) (−)
where the support effect (the first term) is to be traded-off against the initiative effect
(the second term) and the control effect (the third term). The support effect is the same as
in (??), while the initiative and control effect have been analyzed in the paper. We know
that when δvc > ∆R− γ/τ the net benefits of monitoring are negative; furthermore:
∂V V C
∂e
deV C
dδvc
<
∂V EN
∂e
deEN
dδvc
< 0.
It follows that VC’s optimal claim is safer under VC control than under EN control:
δV Cvc < δ
EN
vc .
